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Strategic Position
Benefit Managers Say They
Save Employers Money, By BARBARA MARTINEZ In many industries,
middlemen scrape by on small margins. Not so in generic drugs. Documents from 2001
filed in an Ohio court case show that
Medco Health Solutions Inc. paid $90
that year for the pills to fill 114 prescriptions for a generic copy of
Valium. Medco sent its client, the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio,
a bill of $1,028 for the drugs, which also reflected its dispensing costs.
Medco paid $766 for the pills to fill hundreds of prescriptions for the
blood-pressure medicine atenolol. It billed the Ohio teachers $25,628. Today,
Caremark Rx Inc., another middleman,
charges the federal government and employees $96.88 for 90 pills of generic
Prozac, according to a Caremark Web site. The same pills can be bought
wholesale for less than $5. Medco, Caremark and
Express Scripts Inc. are the big
three "pharmacy benefit managers," or PBMs. Employers that offer
prescription-drug coverage hire PBMs to do the paperwork and keep costs down
when an employee needs a prescription filled. More than 100 million
Americans carry a card with the logo of one of the big three, using it at
the pharmacy to show they're covered. It's a hugely lucrative
place in the food chain. Generic drugs are popular because they save money
by offering alternatives to expensive brand-name drugs. But the PBMs have
figured out how to use mail order to turn generics into a bonanza. Buying in
bulk, the PBMs typically pay a few cents per pill, then turn around and bill
employers a quarter, 50 cents or even a dollar a pill. A Medco spokeswoman,
Ann Smith, says final profit is much smaller than that spread because of
administrative and dispensing costs. For the employers, the
generic prices look like a bargain because they're generally still much
lower than those of brand-name drugs. The employers often don't know the
spreads enjoyed by the PBMs. The big three PBMs'
perch could grow even more valuable over the next five years as brand-name
drugs with $47 billion in annual sales lose patent protection. Copies of top
sellers such as the cholesterol drug Zocor and antidepressant Zoloft will
take a big bite out of the drug industry's profits, while giving PBMs more
chances to sell high-margin generics. More than half of
Medco's net income comes from filling generic-drug prescriptions at its
mail-order facilities, although the mail business including brand-name drugs
represents just 37% of revenue. Collectively, the big three recorded net
income of nearly $2 billion last year. The business has
brought gains for PBM shareholders and made some PBM executives rich,
chiefly from valuable stock options, even as many employers and employees
struggle to afford health insurance. Caremark's chief executive, Edwin M.
"Mac" Crawford, has sold $185 million in stock since November. (See
article.) At Express Scripts, Chairman Barrett Toan has sold
$64.8 million in stock since last fall. It helps the PBMs that
many employers are unfamiliar with the economics of manufacturing pills.
While a brand-name pill such as Lipitor or Prozac may cost employers $2 or
more, most of that goes into marketing, research into future drugs and
profit for the drug company. The cost of actually producing the pills is
usually only a few cents each. After the patent on a drug expires, brand-name makers lose the monopoly that allowed them to charge a high price. But for customers accustomed to the old prices, it may seem like a bargain to get pills that used to cost $2 for just 50 cents.
Recently, some states
have been pushing back against PBMs, weighing laws to force the middlemen to
reveal where their profits come from. The laws would also make PBMs
fiduciaries of their clients, just like accountants or lawyers. That would
limit the PBMs' ability to grab lucrative margins through pricing methods
that employers find hard to follow. Meanwhile, a handful of employers are
looking for ways to buy generics for a price closer to what they cost to
make. But for now, the
generic mail-order business is booming. It represents the latest evolution
of an industry that has played a key behind-the-scenes role in the $250
billion U.S. pharmaceuticals business. The PBMs started out by promising to liberate employers from the grunt work of offering a prescription-drug benefit for employees. They could handle the paperwork when prescriptions were filled at pharmacies and make sure employers paid only for approved drugs. PBMs were early
adopters of technology. When people needed a prescription filled, they could
simply hand over their Medco or Caremark card to the pharmacist, who could
tap into the PBM database to confirm coverage and figure out how much the
employee owed out of pocket. For a while, a good
chunk of the PBMs' profits came from incentives provided by drug makers.
PBMs would try to badger doctors into switching prescriptions to a
particular brand. The PBMs could reap lucrative rebates from drug makers for
doing this. After an outcry about the practice a few years ago, PBMs started
sharing more of the rebates with employers. Early on, PBMs came up with the idea of cutting pharmacies out of the equation altogether. Many people fill prescriptions on regular schedules, and have no need to go to a drugstore every time. PBMs could receive orders by phone or online and send pills directly to patients. It would be more convenient for patients and reduce the risk of errors. It took a while, but gradually employers warmed to the mail-order idea. PBMs sold it in part by promising to switch employees as quickly as possible to cheaper generic copies whenever they were available. Even if the prescription was for a patent-protected drug, the PBMs would try to switch it to a similar generic. PBMs also offered lower prices on brand-name drugs if employees used mail order.
Medco's spread can be wide, as documents from the Ohio court case show. In one case in 2001, Medco paid $514 for the pills to fill 666 prescriptions for a blood-pressure drug. It charged the Ohio teachers' retirement system $5,806. In 2000, the group paid $10.5 million in total for generic drugs that cost Medco $2.3 million.
Gabriela Garcia is head of human resources at Alamo Group Inc., a Seguin, Texas, manufacturer of tractor-mounted mowing and other equipment with 1,500 employees. Ms. Garcia says she never used to look at individual prescription claims to estimate how much profit Alamo's PBM, one of the big three, was making on generic drugs. When a smaller rival showed her some figures a year and a half ago, "the amount of the markups were a surprise," she says. Alamo switched to the smaller PBM, Hyde Rx Services Corp.
Medco says clients save 8% to 10% with the program because it has a good track record of switching mail-order patients to generics. According to Medco, the current generic substitution rate for chronic medicines through its mail pharmacy is 95.3% while at a retail pharmacy it is 92.6%.
In several states, legislators are pushing bills aimed at bringing more transparency to PBM pricing, but they have run into stiff opposition from the PBMs. The first such law was passed in Maine two years ago, requiring PBMs to reveal where their profits come from. It was recently upheld by a federal appeals court. The Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, which represents PBMs, asked the U.S. Supreme Court last month to review the case. Legislators in about a dozen other states are working on similar legislation. PBMs say their services are part of health benefits that are governed by federal law, and states can't impose their own laws. They also say that requiring them to disclose proprietary information violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which bars the government from taking private property except for public use and with just compensation.
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